Iran Can and Will They Make a Nuclear Weapon?

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By JTTC

In the last couple weeks a nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to restrict the nuclear capacity of Iran has continued to erode. The deal’s main objective was to delay, if not prevent, the time it would take for Iran to produce a nuclear bomb. In 2015 the U.S., U.K., France, China, Russia and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran to curb their nuclear weapons programs in exchange for the removal of several crippling economic sanctions imposed by these nations. After Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the agreement it slowly deteriorated. As a result, Iran has been slowly expanding their nuclear program again. In response the United States has continued to levy sanctions on Iran over a range of activities related to their nuclear program, domestic  and international policies. These economic sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy but the fact that the U.S. is the only nation to have pulled out of the accords has lessened the impact. Other nations, like Russia, have  provided economic incentives to Iran in the name of maintaining the accords. This mismatched approach to sanctions on Iran has led to a situation where Iran is both enduring harsh economic sanctions and  expanded their nuclear capabilities.

Iran is one of  many nations that has a complicated, often militaristic and antagonistic relationship with the United States and several of its allies. On top of this, Iran has also sought to increase its nuclear capacity for decades, ostensibly for civilian energy production but also seemingly to produce nuclear weapons to use as a military deterrent. Unlike North Korea, Iran is a signatory to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty allows for signatories to research nuclear based technology while seeking to prevent nations from expanding their nuclear programs. The eventual goal is global nuclear disarmament, 191 nation states are part of this treaty. Like North Korea, Iran often uses its nuclear program to bargain with larger nations for increased economic access to global financial markets. Often this bargaining follows the same cycle in both nations where statements are given the good of nuclear nonproliferation, hopeful denuclearization deals are signed and then relations deteriorate to the point of confrontation and then nuclear reescalation. Currently, North Korea is in possession of roughly twenty to sixty assembled nuclear weapons, and the capacity to create roughly a dozen a year. In late November 2017, North Korea developed weapons capable of not only carrying a nuclear warhead but also capable of striking any target on the continental United States.

A photo from the annual report to the UN Security Council shows a North Korean-flagged vessel conducting a ship-to-ship transfer of coal near the Chinese port of Lianyungang. (United Nations | Reuters)

Given the extensive sanctions that were leveled on North Korea it would be easy to assume that intense economic sanctions are ineffective at preventing nations from creating or expanding their nuclear arsenals. However, North Korea has benefited significantly from assistance to its main international supporter: China. This assistance has come in the form of help evading sanctions or economic resources to mitigate the impact of economic and political sanctions. In the case of Iran, they do not have the same kind of ally. Russia has helped Iran regionally and in initially developing their nuclear program. However, they don’t assist Iran in the same way that China assists North Korea and Russia is even a member of the JCPOA that seeks to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. As a result, Iran was economically vulnerable in a way that North Korea did not appear to be possibly explaining Iran’s willingness to comply with this deal in the first place. The implementation of the deal led to Iran’s largest economic growth rate in over a decade. Similarly, the pull out by the United States and the re-imposition of sanctions by the U.S. has led to a major economic recession with Iran. This move by the U.S. has left Iran and the other members of JCPOA in an awkward position. For example, the U.S. has demanded the United Nations Security Council reimpose sanctions on Iran. However, the majority of the UNSC has actively rejected U.S. demands including every member (except the U.S.) of the JCPOA. What has followed is a complex situation where Iran is only somewhat following the nuclear deal while also receiving some, albeit limited, economic relief.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (pictured on the right) was the suspected head of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Fakhrizadeh was assassinated by suspected Israeli assets on November 27, 2020. (Video Snapshots | Reuters)

The major question is whether Iran can and will fully break the nuclear agreement and develop a nuclear arsenal. The two main things that Iran would need to achieve this nuclear arsenal is to first refine enough weapons grade uranium to produce nuclear weapons. Under the JCPOA Iran must limit its enriched uranium stockpile to 202.8 kg, but a recent IAEA report found Iran to have a stockpile of nearly 2.5 metric tons of enriched uranium. While that’s a breach of nearly twelve times the agreed upon limit it’s far below the eight tons they possessed before the deal. Similarly, the purity of the uranium must be below 3.67% and Iran was found to have breached this in July of 2019 with levels at 4.5%. Iran had previously achieved 20% before the deal. Weapons grade levels of purity for uranium are considered to be at 90-93% purity. Secondly, Iran would need to also develop ballistic weapons capable of striking a wide variety of targets. For North Korea, their first operable ballistic missile came in the 1990’s with a range of roughly 120-170 kilometers. This would expand to 8,500-13,000 kilometers in 2017. Iran’s longest range missile has a maximum range of roughly 2-3,000 kilometers, revealed in 2015. Not only does Iran need to produce enough material to develop a nuclear weapon, but they also need to be able to attach it to a potent enough missile. While 2,000 kilometers is certainly a significant range it’s far short of North Korea’s missile range.

In short, Iran has significant logistic hurdles to producing a nuclear article. A report by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard and Andrea Stricker puts Iran’s breakout time for a nuclear arsenal at as little as3.5 months. However, this is assuming that Iran would use all its current nuclear centrifuges purely for the purposes of producing weapons grade uranium. On top of this, the precarious economic situation of Iran caused by U.S. sanctions provides significant economic and political incentive for Iran to not lose economic relief from other JCPOA members. Iran is certainly capable of producing nuclear weapons but not without other nations noticing and not without further crippling their economy.

JTTC is a political writer for La Tonique.